California Eminent Domain Report : a blog following condemnation, inverse condemnation, and regulatory takings written by attorneys with Nossaman LLP.

We're looking back on 2011's wild ride and looking forward to the twists and turns still in front of us in 2012.  We've summarized all of this into the 2011 version of our annual Eminent Domain Year in Review piece.

For those who don't want to take the time to read the actual article, here are a few of the highlights:

• In January, Governor Brown proposed eliminating redevelopment agencies.  In June, he finally got legislation to accomplish that goal.  In August, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a legal challenge to the new law.  And on December 29, the Supreme Court upheld the law dissolving California's redevelopment agencies, while simultaneously striking down a companion law that would have provided agencies a "pay for play" mechanism to buy back into the system. 
• For the first time, a California court imposed liability for a regulatory taking under the three-part Penn Central test.  The Avenida San Juan Partnership v. City of San Clemente, 201 Cal.App.4th 1256 court held that the city's efforts to down zone a property to preclude its development triggered liability under Penn Central.
• In Galardi Group Franchise & Leasing, LLC v. City of El Cajon, 196 Cal.App.4th 280, the Court reaffirmed the rule that a claim for lost business goodwill must derive from the operation of a business on the property, precluding goodwill claims by a franchisor.  However, the court also held that the franchisee could assign its goodwill claim to the franchisor, allowing the franchisor to make a goodwill claim in the name of its franchisee.
• In Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Alameda Produce Market, 2011 Cal. LEXIS 12171, the California Supreme Court held that one party's withdrawal of a condemnation deposit does not result in the waiver of any other party's right-to-take challenge, despite the general rule that withdrawal of a condemnation deposit effects such a waiver pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.260.

For 2012, we expect considerable focus on the fallout from the Matosantos decision as the unwinding of California's redevelopment infrastructure is dismantled (subject to the success of the legislative efforts to modify the new law).  We also expect continued development of the regulatory takings law, with a possible renewed focus on Penn Central. 

Finally, we expect an increasing split in the way the public views eminent domain, with Kelo torch bearers coming down swiftly on perceived "bad" uses of eminent domain (and, in particular, any version of redevelopment-based eminent domain that might arise from the ashes of 2011).  But for traditional uses of eminent domain for public infrastructure projects, we expect increasing support for such projects, as the public sees the public benefits - and job opportunities - massive infrastructure projects can generate. 

If you want more, go ahead, click the link and read the entire article (you know you want to). 

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Yesterday, we wrote about the Avenida San Juan Partnership v. City of San Clemente decision.  For more information on the decision, see the following:

• Our E-Alert, Court of Appeal Upholds Regulatory Takings Decision Under Penn Central Test;
• Man Bites Dog! California Property Owner Wins Regulatory Taking Case in the California Court of Appeal, a blog post by Gideon Kanner on Gideon's Trumpet;
• Either Reverse Your Unconstitutional Spot Zoning, Or Pay. Your Choice, by Robert Thomas on his inversecondemnation.com blog; and
• Eminent Domain: Winning Owner In Inverse Condemnation Battle Cannot Recoup Fees By Attorney Owner Or Reap A Fee Multiplier Request, a piece in California Attorney's Fees focused, not surpisingly, on the attorneys' fees portion of the opinion.

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Last April, we reported on a bizarre case arising out of the City of San Clemente's attempt to down zone a piece of property.  The trial court had concluded that the down zoning constituted a taking and ordered the City to rescind a decision supported by that down zoning.  The City had denied an application to develop the property because the application did not conform to the current general plan and zoning ordinance (the City seems to have sidestepped the fact that the development applications included applications to amend the general plan and zoning). 

In addition to a writ of mandate ordering the City to rescind its decision, the Court also awarded damages of $1.3 million, representing the overall value of the property ($2.8 million), less the anticipated cost to build a driveway needed to support its development ($1.5 million).  Following a post-trial motion, the Court amended the judgment to make clear that the City had the choice of either (1) rescinding the denial based on the down zoning or (2) paying the damages award.

Yesterday, the Court of Appeal issued its decision in Avenida San Juan Partnership v. City of San Clemente.  It upheld the writ and the determination that the owner was entitled to a damages award, but it remanded the case for recalculation of the amount of the award.  It's a long, complicated opinion, and we'll just hit some of the high points for now.

Spot Zoning.  The Court held that the City had specifically targeted this property for down zoning, leaving it as an "island" of "minimum lot size zoning in a residential ocean of substantially less restrictive zoning."  It didn't help that the enabling legislation that created the new RVL (residential, very low) zoning had described the zone as intended for preserving "open space in canyons" by rezoning "significant acreage."  The subject property was less than three acres - and not located in a canyon.  This was enough to qualify as "irrational discrimination" under cases such as Hamer v.
Town of Ross (1963) 59 Cal.2d 776 and Arcadia Development Co. v. City of Morgan Hill (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1536.   

Penn Central and "Economically Viable" Uses.  The City argued that its action fell short of a regulatory taking, as a matter of law, because the RVL zoning did not leave the owner with no economically viable use of he property, a fatal flaw under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) 505 U.S. 1003.  The Court held that this view "is too limited," and that a taking occurs where a regulation goes "too far," even if some economically viable use remains.  (See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606.)   Where this occurs, courts look to the "Penn Central" test, which the California Supreme Court has held contains three "core" factors:

1. The economic effect on the landowner;
2. The extent of the regulation's interference with investment-backed expectations; and
3. The character of the governmental action.

The Court quickly concluded that all three factors "readily appl[ied]" in this case. 

Timeliness.  As we have reported in the past, regulatory takings claims often fail on procedural grounds, either because they are too late, missing the applicable statute of limitations, or because they are premature, failing on ripeness grounds.  (We've even seen cases, such as MHC Financing Limited Partnership Two v. City of Santee, where claims failed because they were both too late - and too early.) 

Here, the City argued that the owner waited too long to challenge the RVL zoning.  The Court disagreed, concluding that the statute began to run on the challenge only when the City denied the owners' development applications in 2007.   The Court went through a painstaking analysis of the difference between "facial" and "as applied" challenges, holding that the owners' challenge clearly fell on the "as applied" side of the ledger, making it timely. 

The City also argued that the owners' claim was not ripe because the owners failed to apply for entitlements to build what the RVL would have allowed them:  a single dwelling.  The Court rejected this argument as well, holding that under Palazzolo, the City's denial of the application qualified as final. 

Damages.  The Court examined closely the damages award, ultimately concluding that the trial court's methodology was flawed.  The trial court had performed a simple analysis, taking opinions of the value of the property absent the RVL zoning, and subtracting out the cost the owners would have incurred to build the (expensive) driveway necessary to support the property's development. 

The Court correctly noted that this methodology ignores the fact that the takings conclusion was premised on on the Penn Central test, not a "no economically viable use" theory.  Because of this, damages had to take into account the fact that the property still has some value, even with the RVL zoning in place:  "A very large taking is not a total taking."

There were a number of other issues addressed in the Court's opinion, including an interesting attorneys' fees discussion, but I think they go beyond the scope of a blog post.   As we digest the opinion a bit further, we'll probably have more to say.

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We've covered in the past regulatory takings claims and the benchmark three-prong Penn Central test for analyzing potential liability.  We've also noted the issues involved in consistently applying those factors, and the resulting unpredictibility in evaluating the merits of potential regulatory takings claims.  

William Wade, Ph.D., a resource economist with the firm Energy and Water Economics, often writes about these issues, offering clearly articulated potential solutions to dealing with these Penn Central issues.  And Mr. Wade has done it again, as his recent article, Sources of Regulatory Takings Economic Confusion Subsequent to Penn Central appearing in the Environmental Law Reporter, is another fine piece of work.  Among other insights, Mr. Wade explains that

Courts have confused ad hoc considerations of case facts with economic valuation methods, which are not ad hoc."

We recommend checking out our colleague Robert Thomas' blog post about Mr. Wade's article at inversecondemnation.com.  And, as a shameless plug, take note of Mr. Wade's "Author's Note," paying thanks to yours truly for help with the article.  It was a truly enjoyable -- and honorable -- experience working with one of the foremost economic experts in the field of regulatory takings.

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Anyone who's ever been involved in real estate development knows that as part of the permit approval process, developers are routinely required to make concessions to the government in order to move forward with proposed development plans.  And, if you're building near the coast, you usually need to jump through even more hoops (sometimes backwards and through fire) to please the Coastal Commission.  But when do the demanded concessions go too far?

We've covered in the past the "rough proportionality" and "nexus" requirements that development conditions must satisfy in order to withstand scrutiny, but a recent trial court decision in San Mateo County serves as a good reminder.  The case, Sterling v. California Coastal Commission, involves the owners of 143 acres of vacant land in Half Moon Bay challenging a dedication requirement imposed by the Coastal Commission.  The owners sought a permit to build a 6,000 square foot home, and in return, the Coastal Commission demanded that the owners convey an agricultural easement which would require farming the remainder of the property forever (with no other uses allowed).  You may be wondering, where's the nexus; where's the proportionality? 

As suspected, the "forced farming" condition was shot down by the court.  But the Coastal Commission decided to try again and came back with a new condition:  that the owners dedicate the remainder of the property to open space for the public good.  This imposed condition sure doesn't sound any better. 

The trial court once again shot down the condition, finding that the Coastal Commission's imposition of the open space requirement constituted an unconstitutional taking of property, as it is disproportionate to the public impact of the proposed development.  The Pacific Legal Foundation represented the owners, and it reports the court's ruling as follows:

The new condition, in the form of an open space deed restriction is not tailored to the development and is once again irreconcilable with Nollan and Dolan. As compared to the Commission’s prior failed attempt to impose an agricultural easement on the property, the Commission’s new attempt is a distinction without a difference.

The case serves as a good reminder that when conditions of approval go too far, they can constitute a regulatory taking of property.  You can read a more detailed summary by reviewing PLF's Press Release. 

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When dealing with regulatory takings claims, we've covered in the past the maze of procedural landmines that await a property owner.  We've once gone so far as to describe it as resembling "Alice's trip through Wonderland, with the parties falling in and out of state and then federal court (instead of a rabbit hole) based on procedural and substantive rules that often seem as logical as the Mad Hatter's recitals at the Tea Party."  Could one of those major obstacles disappear, allowing land owners a more direct shot at a regulatory takings claim in federal court?  The US Supreme Court could decide this issue if it takes up a new case where the property owners have filed a petition for review.  

While the chances of US Supreme Court review are slim, there's a fascinating new case that has made its way up the judicial ladder that deals specifically with the silly and confusing Williamson County rule that bounces a property owner around our legal system.  Our friend Robert Thomas has a detailed post on his blog, InverseCondemnation.com, that we highly recommend following.  

Generally, the case -- Alto El Dorado Partnership v. County of Santa Fe 634 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2011) -- goes like this:

• The property owner sought to subdivide its property to build residential units.  However, a County ordinance requires subdividing land owners to build "affordable housing" units to be sold to County-approved buyers.  
• The property owner challenged the "affordable housing" obligation in federal court, claiming it amounts to an unconstitutional permit condition in violation of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 483 U.S. 825 (1987).  
• The court held that under Williamson County, the owner's claim was unripe and had to be litigated in state court, and regardless, the owner could not challenge the affordable housing condition under Nollan because (1) it is a legislative (as opposed to administrative) requirement and (2) it does not take real property, but merely restricts the use of land.

In the property owner's petition for review, the US Supreme Court is being asked to decide whether Williamson County's state-procedures rule should be overturned given that it effectively bars property owners from asserting federal takings claims.  

If the Supreme Court takes up the case, it will be fascinating to follow.  We'll keep you posted.

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When analyzing potential liability for a regulatory takings claim, most land use and eminent domain attorneys immediately look to the three-prong test set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104.  Those three factors include:

• the economic impact of the regulation;
• the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and
• the character of the government's regulation.

Unfortunately, it's much easier said than done.  Practitioners and courts alike have struggled over the years in (1) deciding how to measure a regulation's economic impact and (2) determining whether the regulation has interfered with an owner's "distinct investment-backed expectations."  This is especially true given the Supreme Court's direction that each case deserves an independent, "ad hoc" factual inquiry.

William Wade, an expert in financial economics, has prepared an excellent article addressing what has resulted from this perplexity:  unpredictability in evaluating the merits of regulatory takings claims.  Mr. Wade's article, "A few thoughts about origins of confusion subsequent to Penn Central," suggests this stems from "too much talk and not enough math," as the calculations are straight-forward for financial experts, yet the waters are muddied through the courts' reluctance to apply economics and analyze income losses as opposed to property value depreciation.

For example, Mr. Wade suggests that while an appraisal may accurately measure a change in a property's value, it does not accurately measure economic losses to the owner of an income-producing property.  For purposes of analyzing a temporary regulatory taking, Mr. Wade urges us not to consider the property's percentage decline in value, but instead the property owner's change in income.  This is how damages are calculated in tort cases, and Mr. Wade advocates that damages in regulatory takings cases should be no different.

Mr. Wade sums up his article with the conclusion that "[u]ntil the Supreme Court puts an end to faulty understanding of economics within the Penn Central test, . . . widespread confusion of takings jurisprudence will persist."  

The recent Guggenheim Ninth Circuit en banc decision (pet. denied May 16, 2011) turns out be be consistent with standard economics expressed by the Court in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. U.S. (Fed. Cir. 1994) 28 F.3d 1171, 1177: 

[T]he owner who bought with knowledge of [a particular] restraint could be said . . . to have assumed the risk of any economic loss.  In economic terms, . . . the market had already discounted for the restraint, so that a purchaser could not show a loss in his investment attribu[table] to [the regulatory action]." 

While more recent Federal Circuit cases have confounded basic economics, Loveladies made sense at the time and rings true in Guggenheim.  Take a look at Mr. Wade's article for yourself.

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We've been following the Ninth Circuit Guggenheim case for more than a year.  That Court's change in its holding between the initial decision by a three-judge panel and the subsequent en banc decision, coupled with the considerable attention the decision received, led many to think the case was ripe for Supreme Court review. 

Today, we learned that the Supreme Court denied the owner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, meaning the en banc Court's decision will stand.  (As a reminder, that opinion held that the City of Goleta's rent control ordinance did not constitute a taking, despite the fact that the ordinance transferred the vast majority of the mobile home park's value from the park owners to the tenants.)

For those looking for more insights into the Court's reasoning in denying the cert petition, you'll have to try to read the tea leaves of a summary order, "Certiorari Denied," that lists about 200 cases, of which Guggenheim is the 18th.  Most, including Guggenheim, contain no further information.

For those who think this is a shocking result, remember that the sheer number of people seeking Supreme Court review makes the odds of success quite low, even for significant cases.  As I forecast back in February, even if one viewed this case as having a "great" chance at being reviewed, the odds were still likely only around 10%.  In the end, the Guggenheims will have to suffer with the other 200-odd parties whose hopes of a victory in the Supreme Court were dashed in summary fashion. 

In other Supreme Court news, I'm happy to report that today's order also contained information concerning rulings on various attorney disciplinary proceedings, and of the 11 attorneys ordered disbarred from the Supreme Court, I didn't recognize a single name. 

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We've been following the Guggenheim case for more than a year now, and in the last week or so, there have been a number of developments.  As a quick recap, this decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the City of Goleta's rent control ordinance - which had the effect of transferring the vast majority of a mobile home park's value from the park owner to the tenants - did not constitute a taking.  The decision followed an earlier decision by a different panel of the same court, in which the court held that the ordinance did qualify as a taking. 

Not surprisingly, the owner then sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Cert Petition is now pending, and the stack of amicus briefs on the case has been growing rapidly.  I could take the time to summarize them, but fortunately for me, someone else has already done it.  Here are some links to Robert Thomas'  inversecondemnation.com blog from the last week:

• Takings Claims Run With The Land, a post summarizing a brief by the National Association of Home Builders in support of the Guggenheims' Petition;
   
• No "Expiration Date" On The Takings Clause, a post summarizing a brief filed by the Cato Institute in in support of the Guggenheims' Petition;
   
• Ninth Circuit "Did Violence" To Penn Central Test, a post summarizing the brief Mr. Thomas filed and another brief filed by Equity Lifestyle Partners, both in support of the Petition;
   
• Ninth Circuit Applied All Penn Central Factors, a post summarizing the brief filed by the City in opposition to the Guggenheims' Petition.  
   

Aside from these posts, the blog contains a detailed resource page about the Guggenheim case, with links (at least as of the date of this post) to nine amicus briefs in support of the Guggenheims and three amicus briefs in support of the City. 

Nice work, Robert (and thanks for saving me the trouble of trying to keep track of all of this myself).

We'll let you know when the Supreme Court makes its decision. 

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We've covered the Guggenheim v. City of Goleta regulatory takings case pretty exhaustively, most recently noting there is a pending petition for Supreme Court review.  While we wait for the fateful decision as to whether the Supreme Court will take up the Guggenheim case, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued another mobilehome rent control regulatory takings decision in Colony Cove Properties v. City of Carson.  Like the 9th Circuit's en banc decision in Guggenheim, the park owner's regulatory takings claim was unsuccessful.

The owner in Colony Cove purchased the mobilehome park for $23 million in 2006, well after the implementation of the City of Carson's 1979 rent control ordinance.  However, the City amended the ordinance's "Guidelines" in 2006 subsequent to the owner's purchase.  The owner applied for a general rent increase of about $600 per space per month, and the City only approved an increase of $35.  To put the park owner's detriment into context, the owner claimed the ordinance resulted in a $30 million decrease in the property's value, and allowed the mobilehome owners to receive on average $118,000 for their $33,000 mobilehomes.

The owner filed suit in federal court, alleging that the City's rent control ordinance deprived the owner of the value of its property while allowing park residents to sell their mobilehomes at a premium (an argument similar to that put forth Guggenheims).  The owner made a facial and as applied challenge to the ordinance, claiming it violated the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause.

As is the case with many regulatory takings challenges, the district court dismissed the facial takings claim as time-barred, and the as-applied takings claim as unripe.  The 9th Circuit agreed that the district court properly dismissed the case.

In particular, the owner's facial claim was time barred because the 2006 amendment to the ordinance's "Guidelines" was not a substantive amendment to the actual 1979 rent control ordinance, and therefore the owners were nearly 30 years late in challenging the ordinance enacted in 1979.  As to the as-applied claim, the owner failed to first file an inverse condemnation action in state court, which was a prerequisite to bringing the claim in federal court.

Colony Cove involves a slightly different set of circumstances than Guggenheim, but the end result (at least so far) is the same.  The owners' best option now may be to seek their own Supreme Court review and hope that this case, combined with Guggenheim, gets the Court's attention.  .

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The California Court of Appeal recently issued an interesting unpublished decision addressing a property owner's claim that a government entity's regulation of asbestos constituted a regulatory taking.  The owner's unsuccessful challenge presents a nice summary of what not to do when pursuing a regulatory takings claim, and just how difficult it is for an owner to succeed.

In Butte Equipment Rentals, Inc. v. California Air Resources Board, the property owner operated a rock mining and quarrying business.  The owner alleged that two regulations adopted by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) with respect to the quarrying and sale of rock containing asbestos resulted in the owner suffering a complete taking of its right to sell rock and of its right to engage in mining activities.

The trial court granted CARB's motion for summary judgment, holding that CARB was legitimately exercising its police power.  On Appeal, the Court agreed.  It explained the test is whether the "impact of a law or regulation as applied to a specific piece of property determines whether there has been a compensable taking."  In this case, despite the owner's claims to the contrary, the regulations only impaired one portion of the owner's rock quarrying business; the owner was still free to mine, quarry, and sell rock for many other unregulated purposes.  Thus, even with CARB's asbestos regulations in place, the owner was still able to make an economically viable use of its property.

The owner also failed to satisfy one of the key procedural hurdles necessary to bring a regulatory takings claim by not exhausting its administrative remedies and obtaining a final decision from CARB.  Finally, the Court explained that the owner could not successfully present a facial challenge to CARB's regulations unless it could show that the regulations inevitably posed a total and fatal conflict with the constitution.  In this case, the most the owner could do was show that a constitutional problem may arise in some future hypothetical situation.

Butte Equipment Rentals serves as a reminder of the uphill battle a property owner faces when bringing a regulatory takings challenge.  Navigating through the procedural landmines is one tough task on its own, but demonstrating a total taking under Penn Central and its progeny is many times insurmountable.

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The Clean Water Act requires states to identify rivers and creeks that fall below specified water quality standards.  Those water bodies are thereafter designated as "impaired" by the Environmental Protection Agency, and certain standards are imposed to limit pollution and runoff. 

If a river or creek's designation results in a nearby property suffering a decrease in value, does the property owner have standing to seek removal of the designation?  In Barnum Timber Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that such a nearby owner suffering a diminution in property value did have standing. 

Barnum Timber Company, which was represented by the Pacific Legal Foundation, owns property and conducts timber-harvesting operations in the Redwood Creek watershed near Eureka, California.  Barnum argued that its property value decreased when the adjacent Redwood Creek was listed as "impaired."  In particular, Barnum claimed that the listing fed "the public's and the market's perception that Barnum's timber operations are restricted by the listing."  Barnum presented declarations from two Registered Professional Foresters, each explaining that when a listing occurs, the public perceives that the property will be subject to additional and onerous regulation, and the market reaction devalues the property. 

Based on the evidence presented, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the concept that "regulatory restrictions on one property that affect the uses to which a second property can be put [can] lower the second property's value."  The Court also agreed that a regulatory restriction need not be the "sole source of the [property's] devaluation."  The Ninth Circuit therefore held that Barnum -- based on the alleged property dimunition -- had standing to seek removal of the impaired listing.

While the Barnum Timber case strictly deals with the issue of standing, it will be interesting to see whether property owner advocates use the opinion to open up a new door of potential regulatory takings cases where a regulation on one property impacts the value of another property.  The Barnum Timber case may also arguably provide support for a regulatory takings claim where a property owner suffers a dimunition in value from a variety of factors. 

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We thought it was over in 2009 when the Ninth Circuit held that the City of Goleta's rent control ordinance constituted a taking.

We thought it was over in late 2010 when an en banc Ninth Circuit panel ruled the other way, holding that the property owner failed to establish the "investment-backed expectations" necessary to establish a takings claim under Penn Central.

Now, we're not sure if it's ever going to be over.  Apparently, Dan Guggenheim has decided to seek review by the U.S. Supreme Court, so there may yet be more drama for the long-playing battle between the Guggenheims and the city over a mobile home rent control ordinance that the parties seem to agree has the effect of transferring the vast majority of the mobile home park's value to the tenants. 

So what happens now?  First, the Guggenheims must actually file their Petition for Writ of Certiorari, asking the Supreme Court to review the case.  Then, the Court decides whether it wants to review the case, and it's a serious uphill battle.  The Court receives thousands of petitions each year and it typically selects only about 100 of them for review.  In other words, based on the math alone, the Guggenheims aren't likely to see the inside of those hallowed halls. 

But some cases are more likely than others to pique the Justices' interest (four must agree that review is warranted), and controversial land use cases that have garnered media and practitioners' interests - and that have generated multiple, conflicting decisions by separate panels of a federal Circuit Court - probably have a greater likelihood of being chosen then most cases. 

Add to this that the decision comes out of the Ninth Circuit - which has a well-documented reputation for receiving far more than its share of decisions selected for review - and the Guggenheims probably have a decent shot (of course, even if these factors make the case five times more likely to be selected than a typical case, that still probably means only about a 10% chance of being reviewed).

And if the Supreme Court grants review?  Obviously each case is reviewed on its own merits, but according to an analysis of ten years' worth of Supreme Court review, the Ninth Circuit was reversed (or had its decision vacated) 80% of the time and affirmed 20% of time.  In other words, the Guggenheims' odds once they get there are a whole lot better than the odds of getting there in the first place.

We'll let you know what happens.

UPDATE:  February 4, 2011, 4:00 p.m.  Since publishing this post earlier today, I've gotten feedback from several sources, some from people involved in the case and some from other interested observers.  The one consistent comment is a belief that the chances of Supreme Court review are quite a bit higher than I forecast above.   While nobody is telling me they thinks it's a slam dunk, there is some optimism that this really does meet a lot of the criteria the Court looks for when selecting cases.  Stay tuned.

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We've reported on a number of rent control regulatory takings claims making their way through the court system, most notably the Guggenheim v. City of Goleta case.  Apparently, some cities and counties are fed up with the onslaught of challenges to their rent control ordinances, and they're looking for a way to recoup the attorneys' fees they expend in preserving the ordinances. 

According to an article in the Santa Cruz Sentinel, "Monning researching bill to address rent control lawsuits," Assemblyman Bill Monning looks to address this concern by considering a bill that would "allow city and county governments, when successful in defending rent control ordinances, to charge the party who brought the challenge for the government's legal expenses."  While the bill is still in the research phase, all new bills must be proposed to the legislature by February 18.

While such a bill would likely be supported by any city or county with a rent control ordinance, property owners, property rights advocates, and mobile home park owners in particular would likely be vociferously opposed to any such bill and the chilling effect it would have on legal challenges to rent control ordinances.  If this type of bill is proposed to the California legislature, you can expect a major battle.  We'll follow this closely and keep you updated.

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One of the cases we've been following the entire year is Guggenheim v. City of Goleta.  The case involves a challenge to the City of Goleta's rent control ordinance for mobile homes.  The owner claimed that the ordinance had the effect of transferring the vast majority (as much as 90 percent) of the property's value to the tenants, constituting a taking. 

Last September, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an earlier District Court decision, holding that Goleta's ordinance constituted a taking, and it remanded the case for a trial on the amount of compensation the owner should be awarded.  But in March, the Ninth Circuit spoke again, ordering an en banc hearing of the Guggenheim case.  In June, the en banc Court held arguments on the case, and practitioners have been waiting for a decision ever since. 

Yesterday, the Ninth Circuit issued its new Guggenheim opinion, reversing its earlier decision, and holding that Goleta's ordinance does not constitute a taking (the new decision actually replaces the earlier one, so the Court technically affirmed the original decision by the trial court). 

The case's significance lies not just in its outcome.  Merely by reaching the merits of the takings claim, the Ninth Circuit broke new ground.  Indeed, this was the first time the Ninth Circuit had ever reached the merits of a regulatory takings claim arising under the Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City 438 U.S. 104 (1977) test.   How can the Court have avoided the merits of a seminal takings test for more than 30 years?

Penn Central claims have a huge procedural hurdle to overcome.  In order to meet ripeness requirements, the owner typically must exhaust all state court remedies.  But in doing so, the owner winds up with a state-court decision which bars the subsequent federal claim under principles of res judicata.   In other words, if the owner litigates to a final decision on the merits in state court, the federal claim is barred, and if the owner fails to litigate to a final decision on the merits in state court, the federal claim is not ripe.  (Sound like something out of a Joseph Heller novel?)

So the mere fact that the Ninth Circuit reached the merits is hugely significant.  And the en banc decision does not change that part of the earlier opinion, meaning the decision is still a "victory," at least of sorts, for property owners. 

But not for the Guggenheims themselves.  The Court concluded that the Guggenheims failed to establish the "investment-backed expectations" required to state a takings claim under Penn Central because the rent control ordinance preexisted the Guggenheims' purchase of the property.  As the Court explained:

Whatever unfairness to the mobile home park owner might have been imposed by rent control, it was imposed long ago, on someone earlier in the Guggenheims’ chain of title. The Guggenheims doubtless paid a lot less for the stream of income mostly blocked by the rent control law than they would have for an unblocked stream.

There is plenty more to the case that may be of interest, but those details go beyond the scope of a blog post.  The opinion and the dissent by Justices Bea, Kozinski, and Ikuta will undoubtedly provide considerable fodder for practitioners and commentators alike over the coming months.

For more on the case, see our article, 9th Circuit Reverses Course on Rent Control, published in the Los Angeles Daily Journal.   

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We've reported in the past about some of the regulatory takings issues created as a result of the Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority's ("RCA") efforts to conserve property pursuant to the Multiple Species Habitat Conservation Plan ("MSHCP").  It now appears that those conservation efforts have created quite the turmoil with citizens in the City of Murrieta.

According to a recent North County Times article, "MURRIETA: Landowners frustrated with conservation board, city leaders who refuse to meet," about 100 members have organized a group called the Members of Citizens for Quality of Life in Murrieta in an effort to get the City's and the RCA's attention about the ramifications of the MSHCP.  In particular, the property owners are frustrated with the MSHCP process and how they've been unable to develop their property without having to give up large portions of their land. 

The article recounts stories we've heard from many property owners, describing the exhausting maze of paperwork that must be completed, the hundreds of thousands of dollars that must be spent on biological studies, and the repeated denial of any attempt to ultimately develop.  And at the end of the process, the owners claim that they are often left with little choice but to sign a contingent, below-market-value purchase agreement proposed by the RCA that, according to one owner, "will destroy your ability to ever sell your land."

The group wants a sit-down meeting with the City and the RCA, but so far, that meeting has been rebuked.  The reason, according to the City and the RCA, is due to the fact that there is a pending lawsuit brought by the Calvary Chapel - Murrieta seeking $25 million in damages as a result of the MSHCP's designating the church's 118-acre property for conservation.  It will be interesting to follow that lawsuit and the impact it has on negotiations with other owners.

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We reported several months ago about the property owner impacted by the expansion of the Everglades National Park petitioning the US Supreme Court to determine how to treat the government's enactment of tougher zoning standards that decrease the value of property which the government may want to acquire in the future.  The issue presented was whether the government's actions must be the primary cause of the precondemnation depression of the property's market value, or whether there must only be a nexus between the government's actions and the depressed market value.

This is an interesting debate, and according to a recent blog post by the Cato Institute's Ilya Shapiro, the US Supreme Court declined to hear the case.  Shapiro was clearly disappointed, explaining:

[t]he case involved the federal government maneuvering to unjustly drive down property values before taking land for (legitimate) public use — in this case expanding the Everglades — thus greatly diminishing the compensation it was obligated to pay the owners."

I think most people will agree that if the government is taking steps to drive down the acquisition price of property it eventually seeks to acquire, and those government activities result in the property's losing value, such actions should be disregarded when valuing the property.  California's eminent domain law addresses exactly this issue, and courts routinely hold that in such circumstances, the property is to be valued without considering such "project-related impacts."  

The issue becomes tricky, however, when a property owner is trying to prove why the government undertook certain actions that resulted in the property's losing value.  Were the government's actions really in an effort to reduce the property's eventual acquisition price, part of the project for which the property is being taken, or for some other legitimate, but unrelated, purpose?  

I have seen government agencies attempt to avoid paying compensation at all by simply enacting tougher zoning standards on a property, or designating a property for potential conservation (see, for example, the Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority's conservation efforts), which actions essentially make it impossible for the owner to make a viable use of the property.  A nexus standard, as argued by the property owner in the Everglades case, would make proving compensable government impacts much easier.  As it now stands, however, there is no bright-line rule, at least in California, as to whether the "primary cause" or "nexus" test should apply in determining whether the government's actions should be disregarded in determining a property's fair market value. 

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Last fall, we told you about a key rent control / takings decision, Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, in which the Ninth Circuit held that a rent control ordinance consituted a taking.  In March, we reported that the Ninth Circuit had ordered an en banc hearing of the Guggenheim case. 

Yesterday, the Court held the en banc hearing, and while it may be some time before the Court issues its opinion, the hearing itself may provide some good insights about what may happen (and what it may mean in the larger context of regulatory takings claims).  

Very generally speaking, the Court was critical of both sides' positions, attacking the property owner's attorney with respect to how long the ordinances had been in place and whether his clients knew about them when they purchased the mobile home park, only to then attack the City's attorney about the magnitude of the transfer of value the ordinance effected.  

Ultimately, based on what I understand to have been the tone of the arguments, the Court may avoid the merits and rule on a statute of limitations argument, but time will tell.  In the meantime, eminent domain attorney Robert Thomas followed the arguments closely and wrote a comprehensive, three-part summary on his inverse condemnation blog.  It makes for great reading:

• Guggenheim argument summary, part 1
• Guggenheim argument summary, part 2
• Guggenheim argument summary, part 3

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The Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection case received considerable attention both before the Supreme Court agreed to hear it, and following the very colorful oral argument before the Court last December. 

At issue was whether Florida's efforts to restore some of its beaches through depositing 75-feet of sand seaward of the high-tide line rose to the level of a taking due to the restoration work's causing former beach-front owners' property lines to be moved further away from the ocean water.  

What made the case even more interesting was that by the time it got to the US Supreme Court, the issue was framed as whether the Florida Supreme Court's decision in favor of the state constituted a "judicial taking" of property -- a concept first recognized in a 1967 concurring opinion by former Justice Potter Stewart in Hughes v. Washington, in which he explained that “a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents” could qualify as a taking.  In the nearly half-century since Justice Stewart posited the concept of a "judicial taking," no court has upheld such a claim. 

Today's opinion is almost as complicated as the archaic law of littoral rights, accretion, and avulsion that underlies it, with four different groupings of Justices signing on to various portions of three different opinions. 

Let's start with the simple part:  the Court held unanimously that the Florida Supreme Court's decision did not constitute a taking.  The Court upheld the ruling in favor of the state, meaning those beach-front property owners whose property is now a bit further away from the ocean are out of luck.

From there, things get a bit murky.  Four Justices signed an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, recognizing the validity of judicial takings claims.  Specifically, the Justices concluded that if a court declares that what was once a recognized private property right no longer exists, such a decision qualifies as a taking. 

However, they believed that the Florida Supreme Court made no such announcement; rather, they concluded that the Florida court based its decision on existing legal principles.  (Note that the other Justices did not reject the idea of a judicial takings claim; they concluded that the Court did not need to reach the issue at all.)

Now, before you call this part of the opinion a big "who cares," in this case, four Justices did not constitute a minority of the panel.  In one of the case's odd twists, Justice Stevens recused himself as a result of his personal ownership of some Florida beach property.  Thus, this part of the opinion represents half the Court.  Still, under long-standing Supreme Court precedent, in the case of a 4-4 tie, the lower court's decision is upheld, and the opinion of the equally divided Court does not constitute binding precedent. 

Still, getting half the voting Justices to endorse the idea of a judicial takings claim is not insignificant, and property-rights advocates are already trumpeting this opinion as a "victory" for property owners.  For example, Timothy Sandefur of the Pacific Legal Foundation writes in a post entitled Judicial takings in Stop The Beach Renourishment:

Today’s decision gives hope to millions of American property owners whose right to their homes, businesses, and other property is often at the mercy of judges who are willing to totally rewrite the law to expand government at their expense.

It remains to be seen whether this decision will open a new floodgate of litigation against judges.  When and if the day finally comes where a court upholds a "judicial takings" claim, one more interesting issue remains:  who pays the judgment?  

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OK, before I get into this one, you should know that I've been sitting on this story for a week, trying to decide whether it warranted a blog post.  I still haven't quite figured out what happened, and I was just about to let it go, but then my colleague Brad Kuhn pointed out earlier today that the very fact that the whole thing is so odd makes it worthy of a discussion.  So here goes. 

Last week, the City of San Clemente appealed from an earlier ruling by an Orange County Superior Court judge that the City of San Clemente was liable for a taking that resulted when the City (apparently in secret) down zoned a property and then tried to prevent the developer from completing its already approved plans to construct four residential lots on 2.85 acres.  The Court ordered the City to pay the developer $1.3 million, apparently representing the assumed $2.8 value of the property, less the cost to build an access road that would have been required to facilitate development.   

Now comes the weird part.  The development plans were approved in 1983 (yes, 1983), but the developer never proceeded.  According to an April 19 Orange County Register article, Judge: San Clemente owes developer $1.3 million, the reason the development did not proceed was because "[t]he developer held off construction because of high interest rates."  I understand that "high interest rates" might have deterred development for a few years in the 1980s -- but nothing happened for more than 20 years. 

The City apparently updated the zoning for the property in 1993 (ten years after granting the project approvals), but it failed to provide specific notice to the property owner -- this was the City's big mistake.  Apparently, nobody noticed the property had been rezoned until more than 10 years later, when the developer sought in 2006 to renew is application to develop the property.  The City denied the application, concluding that the 1993 zoning applied to the 2006 application, meaning the developer could build only one residential unit.  

The developer complained that it received no notice of the 1993 zone change, and the court agreed, ordering the City to "take it back."  Ultimately, I'm pretty sure that the court ruled that the City has a choice.  It can either pay the $1.3 million (effectively, a rough version of fair market value representing a taking of the entire property), or it must review the developer's new application under the pre-1993 zoning.  Doing so would not necessarily ensure project approval, but at least the developer would get another chance to entitle the property under the old zoning.  

So, what's the moral of the story?  I guess there are two:

1. If you are a developer with valuable entitlements, don't sit and ignore them for 20 or more years and then expect that you can simply pick up where you left off (though that ultimately may be the result here); and 
2. If you are a city trying to enact zone changes (and especially if you want to down zone property), make sure you are meticulous about giving proper notice to all affected owners so that you don't find yourself in a lawsuit fighting over a zone change that occurred more than a decade earlier.

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Last week, my colleague Rick Rayl blogged about the Ninth Circuit's issuing an order granting an en banc hearing of the Guggenheim case involving the City of Goleta's mobile home park rent control ordinance.  If anyone is interested in a more in-depth analysis of the issues of that case, how the en banc process works, how politics come into play, and how the Ninth Circuit may ultimately come out on the regulatory takings issue, Rick and I prepared a more in-depth article that addresses those issues.  The article, "9th Circuit Revisits 2009 Trailer Park Opinion," was published in the Daily Journal on March 23, 2010.

Feel free to let us know your thoughts or any additional questions you may have. 

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We reported earlier this week about the Ninth Circuit's March 12 order to hold an en banc hearing of its decision in Guggenheim v. City of Goleta.  The case involves a regulatory takings challenge to the City's rent control ordinance involving mobile home parks. 

On March 15, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District (San Diego) issued its opinion in MHC Financing Limited Partnership Two v. City of Santee (March 15, 2010, Case No. D053345).  The court rejected plaintiff's regulatory takings claim involving a City of Santee rent control ordinance, concluding that the “as applied” challenge was unripe and the “facial” challenge was stale.  This outcome is not surprising; in fact, one of the things that made the initial Guggenheim opinion significant was that the Court navigated its way through the various timeliness arguments and actually reached the merits. 

The MHC Financing case generated an interesting opinion, and it probably deserves a more elaborate analysis.  But (1) the opinion is really long -- about 50 pages, and (2) another eminent domain blogger, Robert Thomas of the inversecondemnation.com blog has already written a pretty nice summary of the case.  If you want more details, read the opinion -- or just read Mr. Thomas' "cliff notes" version. 

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Last fall, we reported on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, a regulatory takings case that generated considerable interest.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the City of Goleta's rent control ordinance constituted a taking and ordered the City to pay just compensation to the owner of a mobile home park. 

The Court concluded that the ordinance crossed the line because it had the effect of transferring as much as 90 percent of the property's value from the owner to the mobile home park's tenants.  The holding was significant not only because the Court found that the ordinance qualified as a compensable taking, but also because the Court actually reached the merits of the issue.  Many (perhaps most) regulatory takings cases fail for procedural reasons, with the Court never even reaching the merits. 

For example, courts often hold that regulatory takings cases are not "ripe"; in other words, the owner has not demonstrated that all reasonable avenues for generating an economically viable use of the property have been exhausted before filing the lawsuit.  In other cases, courts find the regulatory takings claim to be "stale"; in other words, the owner did not file the lawsuit within the applicable statute of limitations. 

And, finally, in an ironic twist, some factual scenarios apparently warrant the conclusion that the case is both "not ripe" and "stale"; in other words, the owner has not yet exhausted all options, despite the fact that the conduct that might give rise to a claim happened years earlier, creating a statute of limitations problem -- meaning there never was a viable time to file the lawsuit.

Thus, when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals navigated its way through all of the procedural obstacles, reached the merits, and found that a taking had occurred, the Guggenheim opinion understandably generated some buzz. 

On March 12, the case took a new turn.  The Ninth Circuit issued an order granting an en banc hearing of the Guggenheim case.  This means that a large portion of the Ninth Circuit panel (11 judges) will hear the case.  Whether the larger panel will reach a different conclusion than the three judges who initially heard the case remains to be seen. 

In the meantime, the September 2009 Guggenheim opinion is no longer citable as legal precedent.  This could have a significant impact on currently pending regulatory takings cases.   And, depending on whether the Court orders additional briefing and a new oral argument, the new opinion may not be issued for a year or more.  We'll let you know what happens. 

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2009 has come and gone.  With it, we moved one more year past 2005's Kelo decision -- and a lot closer to what those of us who have worked in eminent domain for many years consider "normal."  Massive eminent domain reform efforts seem -- for now -- to be a thing of the past. 

The California Legislature passed no substantive changes to California's eminent domain law, and the closest we came to a marquee eminent domain case last year was probably the Marina Towers decision, which was much discussed, but does not represent any sweeping changes to California law. 

Still, there were a few notable decisions, and we have summarized them all in a "2009 eminent domain year in review" piece.  We also forecast some probable trends for 2010, which include a likely increase in overall eminent domain activity as the economy recovers and the stimulus dollars percolate down to the ground, along with continuing court attention on regulatory takings issues. 

For those who want a "checklist" of notable reported eminent domain decisions from 2009, here it is:

• Murphy v. Burch (2009) 46 Cal.4th 157 (Easement by Necessity / Right to Take);
• City of Stockton v. Marina Towers LLC, et al. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 93 (Right to Take);
• Hauselt v. County of Butte (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 550 (Inverse Condemnation);
• Los Angeles Unified School District v. Pulgarin (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 101 (Business Goodwill);
• People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Acosta (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 762 (Business Goodwill);
• Kearney v. Foley & Lardner (9th Cir. 2009) 566 F.3d 826 (Discovery);
• Guggenheim v. City of Goleta (9th Cir. 2009) 582 F.3d 996 (Inverse Condemnation / Regulatory Takings); and
• Montara Water & San. Dist. v. County of San Mateo (N.D. Cal. 2009) 598 F.Supp.2d 1070 (Right to Take). 

Finally, for a preview of at least one upcoming 2010 case, watch for the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection.  It will almost certainly generate a lot of attention when it comes down.

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Earlier this month, I reported on a Florida case now pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection.  Earlier this week, I reported on some other property-rights issues currently in the news. 

Yesterday, one of my partners, Howard Coleman, took things a step further, attempting to tie recent property-rights issues into a big picture view of what it all may mean for California property owners.   

His piece, Sea Level Rise and Coastal Boundary Lines – Consequences of Climate Change, examines the Florida case, the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Milner, and the California State Lands Commission's December 7 Report on Sea Level Rise Preparedness.

The focus of his piece is foreshadowing what these cases and potential future climate changes may mean for California property owners.  (For a look at the State Lands Commission's Report's findings about potential impacts to our ports, look at the December 10 Los Angeles Times article, Rise in sea levels threatens California ports.)

The bottom line -- at least according to Howard: 

[C]oastal property owners need to recognize the ramifications of sea level rise before it is upon them, in order to have the time to apply for and, if necessary, to litigate the right to build the required protective structures. Otherwise, such homeowners will find both their lands and rights lost to erosion.

The facts of the Milner case suggest owners would do well to heed this warning.  There, coastal landowners built coastal protection structures on their own lands, but were thereafter found liable for trespass when changes to the mean high tide line left the structures outside the owners' property boundaries.  (Yes, the court really did find the owners had "trespassed" on what was their own land before the change in the tide line.)

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One of the big eminent domain stories of the last few weeks involved the oral argument at the U.S. Supreme Court in the Florida beach case.  That case involves whether a government program to add sand to parts of the Florida coastline, creating new public beaches in front of private property that had been beach front constitutes a taking.  For more information about that case, see my December 15 article, "Erosion Control, or Coney Island South?" published in the Los Angeles Daily Journal. 

Now, two other water-related takings issues are making news.  The first, as reported December 14 by Fox News in "Not So Private Property?: Clean Water Restoration Act Raises Fears of Land Grab," involves a proposed amendment to the federal Clean Water Act that would, if adopted, remove the word "navigable" from the definition of the water bodies falling within the Act's scope.  What makes the elimination of one word so controversial?

As currently written, the Clean Water Act regulates discharges into certain bodies of water, including any "navigable waters."  (What constitutes "navigable waters" is a whole different can of worms, especially since the Act has been interpreted to encompass not only navigable waters, but also waters with a "significant nexus" to a navigable waterway -- and because the definition of "navigable waters" has been the subject of recent litigation.)  

Some claim that eliminating "navigable" from the Clean Water Act's scope will create major problems:

The Clean Water Restoration Act currently pending in the U.S. Senate could reach to control even a "seasonal puddle" on private property. . . .

This bill is described by opponents as a sweeping overhaul of the Clean Water Act that could threaten both physical land and jobs by wiping out some farmers entirely.

Not surprisingly, the Act's proponents feel differently, claiming the amendment contains sweeping exemptions to ensure that it does not unduly impact existing agricultural uses.  

The second issue comes from a December 15 Fox News story, "Not So Private Property?: Florida Man Takes Eminent Domain Case to High Court."  It involves a case my colleague Brad Kuhn reported on last month in In Determining Just Compensation, Should Zoning Regulations Enacted to Depress a Property's Market Value for Future Acquisition be Ignored?   The question there is whether an effort to down-zone a property, deflating its value in anticipation of a future government acquisition qualifies as compensable.  The case arises from efforts to expand the Florida Everglades National Park and has a factual history dating back to the 1960s. 

One of the homeowners impacted by those efforts has fought his case through the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which sided with the government and found the down-zoning is not compensable.   However, the owner has petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to take the case.  As reported by Fox News,

The high court hasn't decided yet whether it will hear the appeal in the potentially landmark property rights case -- 480 Acres of Land and Gilbert Fornatora v. U.S.

So is there a thread that ties together beach protection, navigable waters, and an expanded everglades park?  Maybe this:  if the global warming scientists are correct, the world is facing rising sea levels and changing weather patterns.  If this is the case, the importance of clear jurisprudence concerning the interrelationship among property lines, property rights, and the location of water bodies will similarly rise.  Whether these cases ultimately create that clarity or simply add to the existing confusion remains to be seen.  

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The Cato Institute's blog has an interesting post concerning the government's ability to induce local government agencies to enact tougher zoning standards that decrease the value of property which the government may want to acquire in the future. 

The post, titled "A Special Kind of Eminent Domain Abuse," deals specifically with the federal government's actions with respect to property it has contemplated acquiring for 30 years in order to expand the Everglades National Park.  The post  by Ilya Shapiro reports that in the case of 480.00 acres of Land v. United States, the government has forced a property owner

to watch the value of his . . . property decline until the federal government finally condemned it — and paid him much lower compensation than he would otherwise have received.

The question posed is whether the federal government's actions must be the primary cause of the pre-condemnation depression of the property's market value, or whether there must only be a nexus between the government's actions and the depressed market value.  The Eleventh Circuit sided with the government, but the property owner petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case.  The Cato Institute filed an amicus brief in support of the property owner.  The Supreme Court will decide early next year whether to hear the case.  Stay tuned.

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Just over a year ago, on October 1, 2008, the California Court of Appeal issued a fairly rare ruling:  it found a public agency had committed a regulatory taking and remanded the matter back to the trial court to determine the amount of damages to be paid to the property owners.  Specifically, the Court held in Monks v. City of Ranchos Palos Verdes that the City of Ranchos Palos Verdes' rules preventing development in an area susceptible to landslides (the infamous Portuguese Bend landslide area) constituted a regulatory taking that was not justified by the city's power to regulate nuisances and protect the public interest.  (For more details, Brad Kuhn and I wrote an article for the California Real Estate Journal, "California Court of Appeal Opens The Door to Regulatory Takings Claims," that details the holding in the case, and its potential implications.)

 Photo Credit:  Los Angeles Times/Rancho Palos Verdes

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